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Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between organizational complexity (the de-
gree of detail of information necessary to correctly assign agents to positions),
robustness (the relative loss of performance due to mis{allocated agents), and
performance. More complex structures are not necessarily more protable, but
are less robust. One of the least complex structures always performs worst. Su-
perior organizational performance may vanish completely due to mis{allocated
agents. Organizational performance can be enhanced through training agents;
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re{assigning them when adequate knowledge about their characteristics is ob-
tained through monitoring; simplifying the organizational structure; and inu-
encing the environment. The trade{os involved are analysed.
1 Introduction
The notion of complexity gures prominently in the literature on organizational de-
sign. A structure is called complex if it is made up of a large number of divisions
or hierarchical layers or if it contains many interdependent parts the individual func-
tioning of which is of importance to the overall performance of the organization. The
more complex an organization the heavier the demands on its information processing
capacities.
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If the superiority of the information processing capacity of the overall organization
is predicated on judiciously positioned employees within the organization, the knowl-
edge requirements the organizational designer faces may well be challenging. The job of
designing and implementing the optimal complex organization may grow too diÆcult,
impractical, and too time consuming to be considered seriously. In fact, if informa-
tion about relevant characteristics of the employees is missing or partial, simplicity
and ease of optimization may outweigh the superiority of optimally structured, but
more complex organizations. The balance may shift still further in favour of simple
organizations, if the performance of complex organizations is very sensitive to small
1
See for example Galbraith (1973, 1977), Huber and Daft (1987), Jablin (1987), Lawrence and
Lorsch (1967), Scott (1998), and Thompson (1967).
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deviations from whatever it takes to make them operate correctly.
Secondly, an important question is whether complex organizations are suited for
many types of environments or only for a relatively small set. Are complex organiza-
tions more sensitive to changes in the environment than simple ones, or is the reverse
the case?
Any answer to the above mentioned issues involves an assessment of the robustness
of complex organizations. If complexity stimulates protability but at the cost of
diminishing robustness, organizational designers face an important trade-o.
This paper looks at the relationship between organizational complexity, robustness,
and performance. It tries to answer the following questions: What does it mean for an
organization to be complex? How can one measure degrees of complexity? How does
one measure robustness? What does it mean for an organization to be less robust than
some other? Are more complex organizations more protable but less robust than less
complex ones?
I use a very simple model introduced by Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986) to address
these questions. Their model captures an important feature of real world organizations,
project selection, in a simple fashion. Organizations are modelled as sequential deci-
sion structures. Projects, when implemented, can either lead to a prot, X or a loss,
 Y . Screening takes place by error{prone agents: some good projects are rejected (R),
while some bad projects are accepted (A).
2
In other words, agents are characterized
2
Campbell (1958) and authors in the area of small group communication, e.g., Hirokawa and
Scheerhorn (1986) and Gouran and Hirokawa (1986), emphasize the persistence of fallible human
decision making.
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by a pair of probabilities of acceptance (p
g
; p
b
), where p
g
(p
b
) stands for the probability
of acceptance of good (bad) projects. Sah and Stiglitz limit analysis to a hierarchy H
and a polyarchy P
3
. In the former structure, if the rst agent rejects a project it is
rejected by the organization, while if it is accepted it moves on to the next agent. The
decision of the second agent is nal. In the polyarchy, projects accepted by the rst
agent are implemented by the organization. Rejected projects are screened once more
before a nal decision (acceptance or rejection) is taken. Sah and Stiglitz show that
the way in which an organization aggregates individual errors depends critically on the
nature of the sequential screening process. Moreover, which organization is performing
best depends on the type of environment in which it is operating. In `friendly' environ-
ments, i.e, situations in which losses made due to erroneously accepted bad projects
are small relative to the foregone prots stemming from the incorrect rejection of good
projects, a polyarchy performs better than a hierarchy. The opposite holds for `tough'
environments where possible losses are substantial relative to foregone prots. The
intuition is that hierarchies are `tighter' than polyarchies, which is benecial in case of
tough environments, but an exaggeration in friendly ones.
I extend their model by introducing heterogeneous agents (some agents accept less
bad projects and more good projects than others) and by studying three more screening
structures, see Figure 1. The nodes stand for organizational departments, bureaus or
3
A note on terminology. I use the terms hierarchy and polyarchy to be as explicit as possible on the
relationship between the sequential decision structures I use and the ones used by Sah and Stiglitz.
Casual evidence suggests that decision structures in real world hierarchical organizations can take on
a number of forms, including the ones studied here.
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Figure 1: The ve organizational structures studied
desks and the directed edges represent the direction in which projects ow in the
organizations. The label on an edge starting at a node is associated with the action
taken at that node. A node is indexed by the sequence of actions necessary to reach
the node. For example, in the polyarchy P, Figure 1 (a), the project lands on desk 
rr
after a sequence of two rejections. I limit analysis to these ve structures for various
reasons. First of all, by limiting myself to structures with an equal number of nodes,
and by assuming that agents with the same screening capabilities will be paid the same
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wage irrespective of the organization they work for, I can ignore the total wage bill in
prot comparisons. Secondly, as will become clear from this paper, three agents is the
minimal number required to make a discussion of complexity interesting. Thirdly, the
three structures I add have in common with the hierarchy and polyarchy introduced
by Sah and Stiglitz that decisions are taken sequentially, that one person is the rst
to analyse any project, and that an agent can either reject or accept a project. In
the language of graph theory, analysis is limited to the class of nite binary directed
rooted trees. I call the polyarchy and hierarchy `pure' structures. Structures PH and
HP are `hybrid' structures, as they combine in some sense characteristics of both pure
structures.
I dene the complexity of a structure as the level of detail of information that is
necessary and suÆcient to correctly assign agents to positions in the structure. As I
noted at the beginning of this section, the literature on organizational design views the
complexity of an organization as stemming from the number of elements or subsystems
or the type of linkages between organizational parts. This paper shows that dierences
in level of detail of information required in the optimisation problem parallel dierences
in type of structural connections between agents. This denition therefore provides a
unequivocal measure of degrees of complexity. It has the added advantage of measuring
the complexity of an organization not by a feature of its source|characteristics of the
organizational structure|but by its eect on human cognition. A structure is not
diÆcult, complicated or complex of itself, but in the eye of the designer or observer.
As agents are heterogeneous and as correctly assigning agents to organizational
positions may require information about these agents, it will be useful to introduce a
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measure that gauges the extent to which the optimal performance of an organization
depends on the correctness of the allocation of agents. If the organizational designer is
in possession of limited information only, or is error{prone herself, some notion of orga-
nizational robustness to such limitations is key. The notion of robustness introduced in
this paper measures the maximal extent to which the expected prots on implemented
projects can fall short of the expected prots in the optimal case due to the erroneous
assignment of agents to organizational positions (a worst case scenario). The smaller
the maximal reduction relative to the expected prots in the optimal case, the more
robust the structure will be called.
Turning to the results, I show that the hierarchy H and the polyarchy P are of least
complexity as they do not require any information about the agents to position them
correctly. Note that the probability with which a hierarchy accepts a project is the
product of individual probabilities of acceptance. Clearly, who is rst, second, or third
is immaterial. The same holds for a polyarchy: observe that rejection by the polyarchy
requires rejection by all members. The hybrid structures HP and PH require ordinal
information and are therefore of intermediate complexity. The agent located at the
rst node, making as it were a pre{selection, should be the best. Once a project has
passed the rst desk, it moves on to a structure which is really a two person hierarchy
or polyarchy. Swapping agents at these desks leaves the probability of acceptance
unaected. Finally, in the omniarchy, cardinal information is required. Whether the
best agent should be located at 
a
or at 
r
depends crucially on the characteristics
of all the agents. This structure is therefore the most complex of the ve structures
studied. As claimed above, dierences in organizational complexity parallel dierences
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in structural connections.
I show that an increase in the complexity of an organization does not necessarily
lead to superior performance. First of all, and in line with the ndings of Sah and
Stiglitz, which structure performs best depends on the type of environment. The pol-
yarchy performs best in friendly environments, the hybrid PH in moderately friendly
environments, the HP in moderately tough environments, and nally the hierarchy in
tough environments. That hybrid structures perform better for `intermediate' environ-
ments stems from their combining features of both the hierarchy and the polyarchy.
Secondly, the most complex structure, the omniarchy, is never the best organization.
This is quite surprising as an omniarchy in some sense also combines traits of both a hi-
erarchy and a polyarchy. The intuition is that for friendly environments, the polyarchy
P and the PH outperform the omniarchy O as the former organizations accept more
good projects than the latter. Conversely, for relatively unfriendly environments, the
inuence of the probability of acceptance of bad projects increases, making the hierar-
chy H and the HP more suitable. Even for intermediate environments, the interaction
of the characteristics of the agents and of the environment is such that the omniarchy
is never the best.
Interestingly, it is also shown that for any type of environment, and whatever the
characteristics of the agents, the hybrid structures and the omniarchy are never the
worst. It is always one of the least complex structures, the hierarchy or the polyarchy,
that performs worst (the hierarchy when the environment is friendly; the polyarchy
in case of a hostile environment). The reason is that the hybrid structures and the
omniarchy combine structural features of both a hierarchy and a polyarchy. The former
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structures can therefore improve upon whatever is the worst performing pure structure.
In other words, the hierarchy and the polyarchy are highly geared towards a special
type of environment, and quickly loose their attractiveness in other environments.
Turning to the results on robustness, I show that in virtually all instances the
maximal drop in expected prots ensues from (a) interchanging the optimal position
of the best and the worst agent and (b) agents that are maximally heterogeneous.
This is quite intuitive if one recalls the denition of robustness as the maximal drop
in performance due to erroneously assigned agents. Any drop in performance is absent
if all agents are equal, and is likely to be larger (a) the more the precise assignment
aects overall performance and (b) the larger the dierences in individual qualities. As
a consequence, the most complex structure, the omniarchy, is uniformly less robust than
both hybrid structures. That is, for all environments the drop in relative performance
is largest for the omniarchy. That this drop can be substantial is illustrated by a
comparison of the hybrid structure and the omniarchy on the one hand, and the pure
structures on the other. Remember that in the latter structures, no mis{allocation can
occur as the ordering of heterogeneous agents is immaterial. I show that the maximal
reduction in performance is such as to eliminate any advantage the hybrid structures
and the omniarchy have over pure structures.
Which of the hybrid structures is most robust depends on the type of environ-
ment. The PH is more robust in relatively friendly environments, while the HP is less
sensitive to errors when environments are relatively hostile. This is an important obser-
vation as it means that the superior performance of the PH in terms of expected prots
in friendly environments does not come at the cost of relatively low robustness when
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compared to the HP. The same applies for the HP in case of tough environments.
These results suggest a number of means an organizational designer has at her dis-
position when intending to improve the organization's performance: one can improve
the quality of the agents; reduce the gap between information required and information
actually possessed either by monitoring the existing agents or simplifying the organi-
zational structure; and inuence the environment. These means and the concomitant
trade{os are discussed in section 4 in an informal way.
The Sah and Stiglitz model I use in this paper is simple in many respects. It should
be interesting to study the interplay of organizational complexity, robustness, and per-
formance in dierent decision structures. Possible extensions include the introduction
of authority, departmental specialisation, and incentives. In Visser (2000) I study hier-
archies and polyarchies with agents that are fully rational. Their decision rules reect
the position in the organization they occupy and the information revealed by the ac-
tion taken by any preceding agent. In that paper I show that although agents may be
heterogeneous, switching their position in the organization leaves the expected prot
unaected. That is, the result that polyarchies and hierarchies are of least complexity
carries over to a model with fully rational agents.
Although I am not aware of other studies formally analysing the relationship be-
tween robustness, complexity, and performance, two papers are clearly related to the
present study. Ioannides (1987) applies ndings from information theory to sequential
decision structures to show that one can increase the performance of some organiza-
tions by a special type of replication called composition. Composition means that one
replaces an individual agent by a replica of the entire organization. In this way, one
9
can at the same time arbitrarily increase the probability of acceptance of good projects
and, at the same time, reduce the probability of acceptance of bad projects. Such
organizations will be very complex. Within the realm of qualied majority decision
rules, Ben{Yashar and Nitzan (2001) study the robustness of optimal decision rules.
Robustness is measured by the maximal change in the total number of agents that does
not alter the optimal qualied majority. They establish that, in general, such decision
rules are not very robust. In particular, neither the hierarchy and the polyarchy are
very robust according to this measure.
4
In the next section, I introduce the model and the main concepts used. Section 3
presents the main results. The section that follows discusses the eectiveness of various
means of improving organizational performance. Section 5 concludes. Proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
2 The Model and Concepts Used
2.1 The Project Environment
There exists a pool of projects of size 1. Projects can be either of good quality, q = g
(which is the case with probability ) or of bad quality, q = b. An implemented, good
project gives rise to a prot X, while an implemented, bad project leads to a loss equal
to  Y . It will be useful to summarise the state of the environment by  :=
1 

Y
X
.
4
Note that a hierarchy implements projects with the same probability as a majority voting rule
requiring acceptance by all, whereas polyarchies behave like a voting rule requiring acceptance by just
one agent for a project to be implemented.
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The higher , the tougher the environment. This means that either possible losses rise
relative to potential prots, or that bad projects become predominant.
2.2 The Agents
There are three agents i 2 f1; 2; 3g. Each agent can either accept, A, or reject, R, a
project. Ideally, one would like the agents to accept all good projects and to reject
all bad projects. Let p
b
i
(p
g
i
) stand for the probability with which agent i accepts bad
(good) projects. I assume that every agent is fallible: 0 < p
b
i
< 1=2 < p
g
i
< 1. In
words, agents accept bad projects, reject good ones, but do so less frequently than a
randomizing device that accepts one out of two projects. Agent i is more skilled than
j if the former accepts more good projects, p
g
i
> p
g
j
, and less bad projects, p
b
i
< p
b
j
.
This will be denoted by i  j. I assume that 1  2  3. The characteristics of the
agents can be denoted by the ordered pair of vectors (p
b
; p
g
) = (p
b
1
; p
b
2
; p
b
3
; p
g
3
; p
g
2
; p
g
1
).
As the characteristics of the agents dier, it will be useful to introduce a measure
H of heterogeneity of agents. A useful measure is the spread of the probabilities of
acceptance of either good or bad projects:
H
q
=
3
X
i
 
p
q
i
 
P
3
i
p
q
i
3
!
2
; q = b; g (1)
This is similar to the variance of a random variable. Note that I measure the het-
erogeneity per type of project separately, without establishing a measure of overall
heterogeneity.
11
2.3 Organizations
An organization (; ) consists of a structure  and an allocation  of agents to
positions in this structure. As explained in the introduction, I limit attention to the
ve structures,  2 fH;HP ;O;PH;Pg depicted in Figure 1. A structure xes the
ow of projects. The nodes in the structure are indexed by the sequence of decisions
necessary to reach the node, e.g., 
ar
is reached after rst an acceptance at the root
and a rejection at node 
a
. For every structure , an allocation  places agents 1, 2
and 3 at a desk.
An organization (; ) accepts projects of quality q with probability p
q
(; ). The
organizational structure xes the functional form of p(; ), the same for both good
and bad projects. Its precise value depends on the allocation , the characteristics
of the agents, and the type of project q. The functional forms of p(; ) for  2
fH;HP;O;PH;Pg are as follows:
p() + (1  p())[p(
r
) + (1  p(
r
))p(
rr
)] if  = P
p() + (1  p())p(
r
)p(
ra
) if  = PH
p()p(
a
) + (1  p())p(
r
) if  = O
p()[p(
a
) + (1  p(
a
))p(
ar
)] if  = HP
p()p(
a
)p(
aa
) if  = H
(2)
Note that I have dropped the reference q to a type of project as the functional form
does not depend on the type of project.
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2.4 Organizational Performance
The overall goal of the organizational designer is to maximize the expected value of
the implemented projects. This is determined by characteristics of the environment
, X and Y ; the characteristics of the agents (p
b
; p
g
); and by the structure  and the
allocation . That is, W (; ; (p
b
; p
g
);;X; Y ) = Xp
g
(; )   (1   )Y p
b
(; ). It
will be useful to work with a monotone transformation of W :
V (; ; (p
b
; p
g
); ) = p
g
(; )  p
b
(; ) (3)
An allocation  such that, say, ((1); (2); (3)) = (
a
; ; 
r
) in the omniarchy leads
to a prot of V (; ; (p
b
; p
g
); ) = p
g
2
p
g
1
+ (1  p
g
2
)p
g
3
  

p
b
2
p
b
1
+ (1  p
b
2
)p
b
3

.
For a given structure  and agents with characteristics (p
b
; p
g
), the designer is
interested in nding an optimal allocation 

that maximizes Equation 3:


(; (p
b
; p
g
); ) = argmax

V (; ; (p
b
; p
g
); ) (4)
Equation 4 makes clear that the optimal allocation may depend on the organizational
structure, on the characteristics of the agents, and on the environment.
2.5 Knowledge
Although the optimal allocation may depend on the characteristics of the agents, the
organizational designer may not know these characteristics. Indeed, I distinguish three
types of information the organizational designer may have concerning the screening
capabilities of her agents. She may have no information at all about the screening
capabilities of the agents, ordinal information about the agents' characteristics, or
cardinal information. This is made precise in the three denitions that follow.
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Denition 1 There is no information about the screening capabilities of agents 1,
2, and 3, if the organizational designer does not know the pair (p
b
i
; p
g
i
) of any of these
agents, nor can she order the agents. Indeed, she only knows that agents are fallible.
The other extreme in terms of richness of information about the agents is cardinal
information:
Denition 2 The organizational designer has cardinal information about the screen-
ing capabilities of the agents if she knows the vector (p
b
; p
g
).
In between no information at all and cardinal information about all the agents, there
is the situation of ordinal information.
Denition 3 The organizational designer is in possession of ordinal information
about the screening capabilities of the agents if she knows 1  2  3, and if agents are
known to be fallible.
2.6 Complexity
One of the main tasks of the designer is to assign agents to positions within a given
structure. Ideally, she would like to nd the best allocation given the characteristics
of the agents. To do so, she may have to use information about the (relative) qualities
of the agents. The more information is required, the more demanding the structure.
The notion of complexity I use here captures dierences in demands placed on the
organizational designer.
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Denition 4 A structure 
1
is called more complex than 
2
, if nding the optimal
allocation of agents to positions requires more detailed knowledge about these agents in

1
than in 
2
.
In fact, I will call structures of least complexity if no information is required to assign
agents correctly. If ordinal information is necessary and suÆcient, structures will be
called of intermediate complexity. Structures requiring cardinal information are most
complex.
2.7 Organizational Robustness
If the designer does not possess the information needed to correctly allocate agents to
positions in the organization, errors can be made. In an HP or a PH, an error may
occur if the designer misses ordinal information. In an omniarchy, additional errors
can arise if information about the precise qualities, or cardinal information, is lacking.
An erroneous allocation reduces the performance of a structure: too many good
projects are rejected, and too few bad ones are rejected. Is there something the de-
signer can do about this? She could consider to improve her knowledge of the agents, in
line with the requirements of the structure. Agents could then be re{allocated within
the given structure. Alternatively, she could simplify the structure in line with the
knowledge she has. Agents could then be correctly allocated within the simpler struc-
ture. The dilemma she faces is that the more complex structure may be performing
better than the simpler structure if she possesses the required information, but worse
in case an error is made. However, a badly organized but more complex structure may
15
still outperform a well organized, but less complex structure.
In any event, it is important to evaluate the impact a mis{allocation may have
on the performance of an organization. The smaller the drop in performance, the
more robust the structure will be called. For the purpose of this paper I measure the
robustness of an organization in the following way.
Denition 5 Consider a structure , and let 

= 

(; (p
b
; p
g
); ) be an optimal allo-
cation and  any allocation. Then the robustness of a structure  in the environment
 is dened as
R(; ) = min
;(p
b
;p
g
)
V (; ; (p
b
; p
g
); )
V (; 

; (p
b
; p
g
); )
(5)
That is, R(; ) measures the maximal extent to which an erroneous allocation in
conjunction with characteristics of agents may lead to a reduction in performance.
The larger the value of the ratio in Equation 5, i.e., the smaller the relative drop in
expected prots, the more robust the structure. R(; ) is typically a function of the
environment, . In fact, the allocation
~
 and the vector of characteristics (p
b
; p
g
) that
minimize
V (;;(p
b
;p
g
);)
V (;

;(p
b
;p
g
);)
may themselves vary with .
The measure R(; ) can be used to compare the robustness of dierent organiza-
tions, for specic values of  or for all values. A denition that will prove useful is the
following.
Denition 6 A structure 
1
will be called uniformly more robust than 
2
if for
all 
R(
1
; ) > R(
2
; ) (6)
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Of course, one may not be able to order organizations using this strong denition: 
1
could be more robust than 
2
in specic environments, while the opposite holds in
other environments.
Nothing in the denition of robustness excludes the possibility that although 
1
is
uniformly more robust than 
2
, yet 
2
attains higher prots even when it performs at
its worst. The robustness of an organization measures the variability of its performance,
not its absolute level of performance. The robustness of an organization, although of
interest in itself, should also be studied in conjunction with the organization's expected
prots.
3 Results
I now classify the structures H;HP;O;PH and P in terms of their complexity. I also
provide the optimal allocations of heterogeneous agents in each of these structures and
compare their performance of the organizational structures. Finally, I compute their
robustness.
3.1 Organizational Complexity
I now apply the denition of organizational complexity to the ve structures presented
in Figure 1.
Proposition 1 H and P are structurally of least complexity as no information is
required to nd the optimal assignment of agents. HP and PH are of intermediate
complexity. Ordinal information is necessary and suÆcient: the best agent should be
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located at the root. The allocation of agent 2 and 3 to the remaining nodes is immaterial.
The structure O is the most complex: cardinal information is necessary. The worst
agent should be located at the root. Agent 1 should be at 
a
and agent 2 at 
r
if and
only if
 <
(2p
g
3
  1)(p
g
2
  p
g
1
)
(2p
b
3
  1)(p
b
2
  p
b
1
)
(7)
I provide the proof here. Note that in the hierarchy implementation requires accep-
tance by all three agents, with the probability of implementation equal to the product
of the probability of acceptance by the individual agents. Obviously, the precise allo-
cation of agents to these three nodes is immaterial. In the polyarchy, the probability
of nal rejection equals the product of the individual probabilities of rejection. This
is independent of the way agents are assigned to nodes. As the probability of imple-
mentation equals one minus the probability of nal rejection, the polyarchy does not
require information about the agents either. Hence, the hierarchy and the polyarchy
are of least complexity.
Now consider HP. Switching the agents located at 
a
and 
ar
leaves the probabil-
ity of implementation unchanged: the `substructure' that starts at 
a
is a two{node
polyarchy in which the allocation is immaterial. To understand why the best agent
should be positioned at the root, observe that the expected prots stem from projects
implemented by (i) both the rst two agents, with probability p()p(
a
), or (ii) by
the third agent after acceptance by the rst and rejection by the second, with prob-
ability p()(1   p(
a
))p(
ar
). In (i), who is the rst or the second is immaterial for
expected prots. In (ii), however, the ordering matters. This can easily be seen from
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a hypothetical switch of agents. Suppose initially the best agent were located at 
a
and the second or third best agent at . Switching these agents leads to an increase
in the probability of acceptance of good projects at  and an increase of rejected good
projects at 
a
. Hence, the probability of good projects reaching 
ar
increases, and
therefore the probability of implementation of good projects. By the same token this
switch leads to a reduction in bad projects being accepted at  and rejected at 
a
, and
therefore to a lower probability of bad projects reaching 
ar
. That is, both assignments


2 f(; 
a
; 
ar
); (; 
ar
; 
a
)g are optimal. The same line of reasoning holds in case
of PH. Ordinal information is necessary and suÆcient in both HP and PH. These
structures are therefore of intermediate complexity.
In the omniarchy, the optimal allocation depends on the values of the characteristics
of the agents and the type of environment. First of all, agent 3, the worst agent, should
be located at . The intuition is that the agent at  merely delegates the decision to
implement to the agents at 
a
and 
r
. Hence, the agents located at the latter two
nodes should be better than the one at the former.
Formally, consider the two possible allocations with agent 3 at the root. As I
leave undened the allocation of agents 1 and 2 to nodes 
a
and 
r
, the probability
of implementation can be written as p
3
p(
a
) + (1   p
3
)p(
r
). Switching agent 3 and
whoever was initially located at 
a
leads to a probability of implementation of p(
a
)p
3
+
(1 p(
a
))p(
r
). The dierence in probability ensuing from this switch equals p(
r
)(p
3
 
p(
a
)). Now observe that, irrespective of whether agent 1 or 2 was initially assigned
to 
a
, p
g
3
  p
g
(
a
) < 0 and p
b
3
  p
b
(
a
) > 0. That is, starting with agent 3 at the root,
the switch leads to fewer good projects being accepted, and less bad projects being
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rejected. This has an unambiguous negative eect on expected prots. Similarly, it
can be shown that switching agent 3 at  and agent 1 or 2 at 
r
leads to a reduction
in expected prots. This establishes that in any optimal allocation agent 3 should be
assigned to the root.
The question that remains is the allocation of agent 1 and 2. Consider allo-
cation 
1
= (
a
; 
r
; ) and compare its expected prots with those of allocation

2
= (
r
; 
a
; ). That is, agents 1 and 2 are being switched.
V (O; 
1
; (p
b
; p
g
); ) V (O; 
2
; (p
b
; p
g
); ) = (2p
g
3
 1)(p
g
2
 p
g
1
) (2p
b
3
 1)(p
b
2
 p
b
1
) (8)
That is, agent 1 should be located at 
a
and agent 2 at 
r
(or, 
1
is better than 
2
) if
and only if
 <
(2p
g
3
  1)(p
g
2
  p
g
1
)
(2p
b
3
  1)(p
b
2
  p
b
1
)
(9)
This shows that cardinal information is required in an omniarchy. It is therefore the
most complex organization studied. This completes the proof.
Equation 9 says that, for suÆciently friendly environments, the best agent should
be located at 
a
, whereas for relatively tough environments this agents is best located
at 
r
. The reason is as follows. Most good projects land on 
a
(as p
g
3
> 1=2), while
most bad projects go to 
r
(as 1   p
b
3
> 1=2). Therefore, if there are relatively many
good projects, or the prot X is high relative to the possible loss Y , that is, if  is
relatively low, it is more important to have the best agent at 
a
. The opposite holds
for high values of .
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3.2 Comparing Performance
In the preceding subsection, I determined the correct ordering of agents for dierent
structures. In this subsection I will assume agents have been correctly assigned, and
compare the ensuing expected prots of the ve structures. Before presenting some
general results formally, I use Figure 2 to illustrate a few characteristics that generally
hold.
0 1 2 3 4
0
0:2
0:4
0:6
0:8
1:0

V (; ; 

)
P
PH
O
HP
H
Figure 2: The expected pay{os of the ve organizational structures studied, with
(p
b
; p
g
) = (0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9)
Although Figure 2 is based on specic values of (p
b
; p
g
), it illustrates a few important
general features of the prot comparison that hold for all possible vectors of agents'
capabilities.
Note rst of all that by moving from left to right, from friendly to hostile environ-
ments, rst the polyarchy, then the hybrid PH, then HP, and nally the hierarchy is
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the best structure. This follows from the progressively growing demands imposed on
project implementation experienced when moving from a polyarchy to a hierarchy.
The second observation is that the omniarchy is never the best structure. The intu-
ition is as follows. The performance of O is a convex combination of the performance
of agents 1 and 2, where the optimal weights depend on condition 7. Hence, O behaves
approximately as a single agent organization. In friendly environments, the polyarchy
P and the PH outperform the omniarchy O as the former organizations accept more
good projects than the latter. Conversely, for rising values of , the inuence of the
probability of acceptance of bad projects increases, making the hierarchy H and the
HP more suitable. The formal proof establishes that the interaction of the various
dimensions is such that even for intermediate environments the omniarchy is never the
best.
Thirdly, the worst performing structure is either the polyarchy or the hierarchy.
Their superior performance in extremely friendly or extremely hostile environments,
respectively, comes at the cost of quickly loosing performance outside these environ-
ments.
Formally, these three observations amount to:
Result 1 For every vector (p
b
; p
g
), there are values 
1
< 
2
< 
3
, such that P attains
higher prots than any other organization for  < 
1
; PH for 
1
<  < 
2
; HP for

2
<  < 
3
; and H for  > 
3
. This implies that for every vector (p
b
; p
g
) and for
any , there is always an organization (; 

) with  2 fH;HP;PH;Pg that attains
higher expected prots than (O; 

).
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Result 2 For every vector (p
b
; p
g
) and for any , either the hierarchy H or the pol-
yarchy P attains the lowest expected prots. For low values of , the hierarchy performs
the worst, whereas for high values of , the polyarchy does.
What do these results mean in terms of the relationship between complexity and ex-
pected prots? The rst result indicates that complexity is not benecial per se: only
for intermediate environments does the extra complexity that comes with a hybrid
structure pay o. The rst result also implies that the most complex structure is never
the best. Hence, in the present model and with denition of complexity used here, com-
plexity is not unequivocally benecial: only for specic environments in combination
with particular values of the characteristics of the agent do structures of intermediate
complexity outperform ones of least complexity. The second result can be restated as
follows. It is a structure of least complexity that attains the lowest expected prots
for any given environment.
Jointly, these results suggest an important trade{o between complexity and per-
formance, especially in case of uncertainty about the type of environment. Hierarchies
and polyarchies require little information and they perform best in specic environ-
ments. This is a plus. However, they perform worse than other structures virtually as
soon as they are not the best anymore. Hybrid structures require more information,
which may be costly to acquire, but their performance is not as susceptible to changes
in the environment as is the performance of a hierarchy or a polyarchy. Moreover, they
are best for some types of environment. There is no trade{o at the most advanced
level of complexity: the omniarchy is never better than all other organizations, yet is
23
requires the highest level of detail of information.
3.3 Robustness
The robustness of an organization measures the maximal drop in expected prots due
to an erroneous allocation of agents. The smaller this drop, the less sensitive the
organization is to errors, the higher is the organization's robustness.
Before discussing the ndings, let me explain the method used to establish the
results. Remember that to nd R(; ) one has to minimise over both the admissible
values of the characteristics of the agents and any possible allocation. This space is
seven dimensional. Fortunately, the minimisation problem can be split up in two parts.
First of all, for every structure I determine whether some mis{allocation would lead
to uniformly larger errors, i.e., for all values of (p
b
; p
g
), than other mis{allocations.
Both in case of HP and PH, the allocation with the worst agent instead of the best
at node  creates uniformly the largest relative drop in performance. The allocation of
agent 1 and 2 to the remaining positions is immaterial. In the omniarchy, locating the
best agent instead of the worst agent at  leads uniformly to the largest error. Where
agent 2 and 3 should be located, at 
a
or at 
r
, depends on the characteristics of the
agents.
Result 3 For both  = HP and  = PH and for any characteristics of the agents
(p
b
; p
g
), switching the best and the worst agents leads to the maximal drop in expected
prots. For  = O, assigning the best agent to the optimal position of the worst agent
is necessary to create the largest fall in prots.
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This comes close to saying that the maximum drop in protability is always a con-
sequence of assigning the best and the worst agents to each other's correct position.
This statement is correct for the hybrid structures, but not quite for the omniarchy:
although the best agent should be located at node , the position of the worst agent
depends on the agents' characteristics and the type of environment.
Then I determine for each structure and the selected mis{allocation(s) the charac-
teristics of the agents that maximize the drop in performance. Here I allow for the
possibility of boundary cases, i.e., p
b
i
2 [0; 1=2] or p
g
i
2 [1=2; 1]. If maximising the rela-
tive error actually requires a boundary value, this should be interpreted as an interior
solution arbitrarily close to the boundary. The continuity of V () in the characteristics
of the agents ensures the correctness of such an interpretation.
Result 4 summarizes for which values of (p
b
; p
g
) and for which mis{allocation the
drop in performance is maximal.
Result 4 For every structure  2 fHP;PH;Og, Table 1 reports the correct allocation


, the one that maximizes the drop in relative performance
~
, and the values of (p
b
; p
g
)
that minimize the relative performance.
Clearly, in virtually all cases the drop in relative performance is largest when the
characteristics of the agents take on extreme values, like 0,
1
2
, or 1. The only exceptions
are the hybrid structures in case of specic environments: for  = HP and  =
2
3
, and
for  = PH and  =
5
6
, the values of p
b
1
and p
g
1
, respectively, can be freely chosen. As
these are non{generic cases, I do not discuss them.
The most important observation to make, however, concerns the relationship be-
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 (

(1); 

(2); 

(3)) (
~
(1);
~
(2);
~
(3)) (p
b
; p
g
)
HP (; 
a
; 
ar
) (
ar
; 
a
; )
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
(0; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1; 1) if  2 [0; 2=3)
([0;
1
2
]; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1; 1) if  = 2=3
(1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1; 1) if  2 (
2
3
;
4
3
]
PH (; 
r
; 
ra
) (
ra
; 
r
; )
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
(0; 0; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1) if  2 [0;
5
6
)
(0; 0; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; [
1
2
; 1]) if  =
5
6
(0; 0; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2) if  2 (
5
6
;
5
4
]
O (
a
; 
r
; ) (; 
r
; 
a
) (0; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1; 1)
Table 1: Characteristics of the agents and allocations that jointly maximize the relative
drop in performance per structure.
tween these extreme values and the heterogeneity of agents: in virtually all instances
the maximal drop in performance is the result of having agents that are maximally
heterogeneous. In case of three agents, maximal heterogeneity is characterized by
Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 Suppose one wants to maximize the heterogeneity H of agents as measured
by
H =
3
X
i
 
p
q
i
 
P
3
i
p
q
i
3
!
2
(10)
for q = b and q = g, subject to 0  p
b
1
 p
b
2
 p
b
3
 1=2 and 1=2  p
g
3
 p
g
2

p
g
1
 1, respectively. The values that solve these problems are
 
p
b
1
; p
b
2
; p
b
3

= (0; 0; 1=2)
or (0; 1=2; 1=2) in case of bad projects, and (p
g
3
; p
g
2
; p
g
1
) = (1=2; 1=2; 1) or (1=2; 1; 1) for
good projects.
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One directly observes, by comparing the values of (p
b
; p
g
) in Table 1 with Lemma 1,
that in case of the omniarchy O, the HP for  < 2=3, and the PH for  < 5=6, the
maximal drop in protability stems from maximal heterogeneity of the agents, both
as far as good projects and bad projects are concerned. In case of HP or PH and
high values of , maximal heterogeneity is limited to one dimension of the agents'
characteristics (probability of acceptance of good projects in case of HP , and of bad
projects for PH). It is quite intuitive that the maximal drop in protability stems
from agents that are as heterogeneous as possible. Any change in assignment will then
have a maximal impact.
Result 5 For all structures  2 fHP ;PH;Og and for virtually all environments , a
maximal reduction in expected prots requires agents that are maximally heterogeneous.
Roughly speaking, the implication of Results 3 and 5 is that the maximal drop in
performance stems from, rstly, switching the best and the worst agent, and secondly
making agents maximally dierent.
Complementing the information in Table 1 is information about expected prots
associated with the allocations and characteristics reported in that Table. This infor-
mation, together with the ensuing robustness of each structure, R(; ), can be found
in Table 2. That is, the information presented in Tables 1 and 2 corresponds line
by line. Take for example the line concerning HP . The vector 

given in Table 1,


= (; 
a
; 
ar
), is the one used in the calculation of V (; 

; ) for  = HP in
Table 2. Similarly for
~
 and V (;
~
; ). Of course, R(; ) = V (;
~
; )=V (; 

; ).
Figure 3 shows the graphs of R(; ). It reveals that O is uniformly the least robust
27
 V (; 

; ) V (;
~
; ) R(; )
HP
1 for  2 [0;
2
3
)
1 
1
2
p
b
1
for  =
2
3
1  0:375 for  2 (
2
3
;
4
3
]
0:5  0:25
1
3
 
1
6
p
b
1
0:5  0:375
0:5  0:25
1
3
0:5  0:375
1  0:375
PH
1 for  2 [0;
5
6
)
3
4
p
g
1
+
1
4
for  =
5
6
0:625 for  2 (
5
6
;
5
4
]
0:75  0:5
1
4
p
g
1
+
1
12
0:625  0:5
0:75  0:5
1
3
1  0:8
O 1  0:25 0:5  0:5
0:5  0:5
1  0:25
Table 2: Expected prots with correctly allocated agents, with mis{allocated agents,
and the robustness per structure.
structure. The PH is the most robust structure in relatively friendly environments,
as is HP in tougher environments. Roughly speaking, when PH outperforms HP in
terms of expected pay{os V (; 

; ) it is also more robust than HP
5
. This is an
interesting result as it shows that good performance of a hybrid structure does not
come at the cost of increased sensitivity to mis{allocations.
Proposition 2 O is uniformly the least robust structure. The PH is the most robust
structure in relatively friendly environments, as is HP in tougher environments.
This proposition and Figure 3 capture to what extent the performance of a given
structure is maximally reduced due to a misallocation. Given that the pure hierarchy
and polyarchy are fully error{proof, it is interesting to see to what extent superior
5
Roughly speaking, since an exact comparison is impossible as the calculations of R(HP ; ) and
R(PH; ) are based on dierent values of the characteristics of the agents.
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R(; )
2
3
4
3
5
6
5
4
1
1
3
1
2
3
4
1
O
HP
PH
Figure 3: The robustness of PH, HP and O.
performance of HP, PH, and O is predicated on the optimal allocation. Figure 4
shows for every value of  and for the characteristics (p
b
; p
g
) reported in Table 1 how
well these structures|HP to the left, PH in the middle, O to the right|fare relative
to the hierarchy and the polyarchy, both for the correct allocation, 

() in the upper
part of the graph, and for
~
(), the mis{allocationmaximising the drop in performance,
in the lower part. For example, for  = HP, if all agents have been correctly allocated
HP performs better than H for  < 1, whereas the opposite holds for  > 1. HP
performs as well as P for  = 0. If agents have been erroneously assigned, the lower
part shows that either P or H perform better than HP for all .
The three graphs show that the adverse eect on performance can be dramatic indeed:
in the situations depicted the comparative advantage of HP , PH or O completely
vanishes due to allocating agents erroneously.
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0 0 0
~

2
3
P H
1
P H
2
3
P H
  
0 0 0


1
HP H
P; HP
PH
P; PH
2
O H
P; O
 = HP  = PH  = O
Figure 4: Area of superior performance of HP , PH and O when compared with the
least complex structures H and P, when agents have been correctly assigned (

, or
top part) and when the relative error is maximized (
~
, or lower part).
4 Trade{os in organizational design
Various ways are open to an organizational designer who wishes to improve the perfor-
mance of her organization, and who possesses only limited knowledge on the qualities
of her employees and of the environment in which she operates.
First of all, she could invest in training that enhances the screening capacity of
her employees. Training leads to an unambiguous rise in the expected value of imple-
mented projects, whether employees are correctly allocated or not. This is clear from
Equation 2. Of course, there are costs associated with training. The eectiveness of
money spent on training should be compared with that of other means of generat-
ing additional revenue. Replacing existing employees by more skilled ones is another
possibility. This assumes the possibility of comparing the quality of existing and new
employees.
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Secondly, she could invest in monitoring her present employees to get a better
view of their skills. She may then be able to re{position her employees thanks to the
additional information so obtained. How much she is maximally willing to spend on
monitoring is related to the robustness of a structure, since the notion of robustness is
based on a comparison of the expected prots of an optimally organized structure with
the worst performance of the same structure when agents are incorrectly positioned.
Instead of monitoring, the organizational designer could decide to bridge the gap
between information she possesses and information which is required by simplifying the
present organizational structure in line with the information she currently has. The
cost of a re{organization should be compared with the increase in revenues. Absent
cardinal information, she could decide to content herself with hybrid or pure structures.
Similarly, ordinal information lacking, she could settle with a hierarchy or a polyarchy.
Although this prohibits mis{allocations from occurring, it does not necessarily guar-
antee an increase in protability. The one situation in which it does, is when the
omniarchy is replaced by a hybrid structure and ordinal information is present. This
follows from Result 1. However, if any information about the qualities of the employees
is missing, a hybrid structure in which agents are potentially mis{allocated may still
perform better than a pure structure in which no information is required. Moreover, if
the designer is uncertain about the exact type of environment, the pure structures ex-
pose her to a much larger variation in possible pay{os, including to the lowest pay{os
possible, than do the hybrid structures. This is clear from Figure 2, and Result 2.
Yet another way of improving organizational performance is collecting information
on the state of the environment with a view to adjusting the internal structure or
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inuencing the environment to the benet of the present organization. The costs of
inuencing may well be lower than those associated with measures meant to improve
the adequacy of the organization for a given environment. It seems plausible to assume
that the larger the organization, the lower the costs of inuencing the environment when
compared with the expenses incurred to improve the internal organization.
The means chosen to improve performance will depend on their relative cost eec-
tiveness and on the degree of risk aversion of the organizational designer.
5 Conclusion
This paper illustrates how one could approach the relationship between organizational
complexity, robustness, and performance. Complexity, dened as the level of detail
of information needed to correctly allocate agents within an organizational structure,
and robustness, dened as the degree to which organizations do not suer from mis{
allocations, prove useful categories to distinguish organizational structures: one can
sensibly talk about dierent degrees of complexity, and one can compare organizational
structures in terms of their robustness.
One of the results of this paper is that increasing the complexity of an organizational
amounts to reducing its robustness. This may annihilate the superior performance of
more complex organizations if the organizational designer does not possess the re-
quired detail of information. The superior performance of the hybrid structures HP
and PH was shown to rely in a crucial way on ordinal information about the agents
working in the organization. This information being absent, their superiority can van-
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ish completely. The designer faces a diÆcult choice: improve her knowledge of the
agents, improve the quality of the agents, simplify the structure of the organization,
or inuence the environment?
The conclusion of this paper concerning the omniarchy is quite negative. Rem-
iniscent of commonly used delegation structures, it is more complex than the other
structures and less robust. In theory, these disadvantages could be oset by superior
performance. However, it was also shown that the omniarchy always performs worse
than some other organization. This should not be taken as the nal verdict on dele-
gation structures. As I observed in the introduction, the approach taken in this paper
should be considered a rst step towards an understanding of the relationship between
organizational performance, complexity, and robustness. I therefore excluded aspects
of organizational design and behaviour, such as specialization, agency, and conict of
interests, the inclusion of which may have changed the evaluation of an omniarchy.
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Appendix for Referees
Proof of Result 1 As this result involves a general statement about a seven dimen-
sional parameter{space ((p
b
; p
g
) and ) involving ve dierent structures providing an
analytical proof is hard for the following reason. Fix values for (p
b
; p
g
) and calculate for
every pair of organizations the `pivotal' value of  at which this pair performs equally
well. In the statement of the result I mention three such values, 
i
, i = 1; 2; 3. The
`less strict' organization always performs better for values of  lower than the pivotal
value, and vice versa. These pivotal values are ordered along the positive line{segment.
The problem is that this ordering may change with certain changes in (p
b
; p
g
). This
makes it diÆcult to establish analytically whether 
1
< 
2
< 
3
holds for all (p
b
; p
g
),
and whether the omniarchy is better than any other structure for some values of the
parameters. I have therefore taken recourse to numerical methods. There was no
instance among the 27 million randomly chosen vectors such that the omniarchy per-
formed better than all other structures. 2
Proof of Result 2 This Result is based on the same 27 million randomly chosen
vectors. 2
Proof of Result 3 I discuss the three structures  2 fHP;PH;Og in turn.
When  = HP , a suÆcient condition for optimality is to have agent 1 at node ;
the allocation of agents 2 and 3 to 
a
and 
ar
is immaterial (see Proposition 1). Any
mis{allocation involves either agent 2 or 3 at . If, say, agent 2 is at the root, the precise
allocation of agents 1 and 3 is immaterial. Similarly if agent 3 is at the root. There are
therefore two generic mis{allocations: (i) agent 2 at node 1, or (ii) agent 3 at node 1.
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In case (i) the probability of acceptance of a project of type q equals p
q
2
(p
q
1
+(1 p
q
1
)p
q
3
),
whereas in (ii) the probability of acceptance equals p
q
3
(p
q
1
+(1  p
q
1
)p
q
2
). The dierence
in probability of acceptance between (i) and (ii) therefore amounts to p
q
1
(p
q
2
  p
q
3
),
which is larger than zero for q = g, and smaller than zero for q = b for all (p
b
; p
g
).
That is, allocation (i) accepts more good and less bad projects than allocation (ii).
Expected prots are lowest in case (ii), or when the best and the worst agents have
switched position.
An analogous proof can be provided for  = PH.
Finally  = O. Consider the case where  
(2p
g
3
 1)(p
g
2
 p
g
1
)
(2p
b
3
 1)(p
b
2
 p
b
1
)
, or agent 1 should
be located at 
r
and agent 2 at 
a
(see Proposition 1). Here, one has to compare
the ve possible mis{allocations: 
1
= (
r
; ; 
a
), 
2
= (
a
; 
r
; ), 
3
= (
a
; ; 
r
),

4
= (; 
a
; 
r
) and 
5
= (; 
r
; 
a
). Just as in case of  = HP, the analysis is based
on comparing probabilities of acceptance. For convenience sake, let me denote the
dierence in probability of acceptance of a project of type q between allocation 
i
and

j
by (
i
; 
j
; q). Thus, (
3
; 
4
; q) = p
q
3
(p
q
1
  p
q
2
). This expression is positive for
good projects, but negative for bad projects. That is, 
4
generates uniformly smaller
prots. Similarly, (
1
; 
5
; q) = (p
q
1
  p
q
2
)(1  p
q
3
), which is positive for good projects,
and negative for bad ones: 
5
generates uniformly smaller prots. A comparison of 
2
with 
5
shows that (
2
; 
5
; q) = p
q
2
(p
q
1
  p
q
3
). This expression is positive for q = g,
and smaller than zero if q = b, meaning that 
5
gives rise to larger reductions in prots
than 
2
. That is, either 
5
or 
4
leads to the largest drop in prots. In either case,
agent 1 is located at node . Whether 
5
or 
4
leads to a larger drop depends on
37
(p
b
; p
g
) and . A similar proof shows that also in case of  <
(2p
g
3
 1)(p
g
2
 p
g
1
)
(2p
b
3
 1)(p
b
2
 p
b
1
)
the largest
drop in prots results from assigning agent 1 to . 2
Proof of Result 4 The correct allocations 

follow from Proposition 1. The incorrect
allocations
~
 for  = HP and  = PH follow from Result 3. The latter result also
established that in the omniarchy the best agent should be located at  if the drop
in performance is to be maximal. In this proof, I determine the vector (p
b
; p
g
) that
maximizes the drop in performance when (i)  = HP , (ii)  = PH, and (iii)  = O.
In any event, this vector (p
b
; p
g
) can be found by maximizing the Lagrangian:
L((p
b
; p
g
); ; ; ) =  
V ((p
b
; p
g
); ;
~
; )
V ((p
b
; p
g
); ; 

; )
 
8
X
i=1

i
h
i
(p
b
; p
g
) (A.1)
with respect to the probabilities (p
b
; p
g
) under the restrictions 0  p
b
1
 p
b
2
 p
b
3

1
2
 p
g
3
 p
g
2
 p
g
1
 1 rewritten as h
i
(p
b
; p
g
)  c
i
for i = 1; : : : ; 8, where h
1
=  p
b
1
 0,
h
2
= p
b
1
  p
b
2
 0, h
3
= p
b
2
  p
b
3
 0, h
4
= p
b
3

1
2
, h
5
=  p
g
3
  
1
2
, h
6
= p
g
3
  p
g
2
 0,
h
7
= p
g
2
  p
g
1
 0, and h
8
= p
g
1
 1. Note that I have written V ((p
b
; p
g
); ; ; )
instead of V (; (p
b
; p
g
); ) to highlight that the optimization leaves the structure, the
allocations, and the value of  unchanged. In what follows it will be convenient to write
the short{hand form V () instead of V ((p
b
; p
g
); ; ; ). Moreover, the derivative of
p
q
(; ) with respect to p
q
i
will be written as p
q0
i
(; ) The necessary conditions for
optimality are
p
g0
1
(; 

)V (
~
)  p
g0
1
(;
~
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
8
  
7
(A.2)
p
g0
2
(; 

)V (
~
)  p
g0
2
(;
~
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
  
6
(A.3)
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pg0
3
(; 

)V (
~
)  p
g0
3
(;
~
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
6
  
5
(A.4)
p
b0
1
(;
~
)V (

)  p
b0
1
(; 

)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
2
  
1
(A.5)
p
b0
2
(;
~
)V (

)  p
b0
2
(; 

)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
3
  
2
(A.6)
p
b0
3
(;
~
)V (

)  p
b0
3
(; 

)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
4
  
3
(A.7)
and 
i
 0, h
i
(p
b
; p
g
)  c
i
, and 
i
 
h
i
(p
b
; p
g
)  c
i

= 0, for i = 1; : : : ; 8. Note that I
have divided the conditions A.5{A.7 by . The case  = 0 implies that bad projects
are irrelevant. In that case, the relevant rst order conditions become the rst three
with V (
~
) and V (

) replaced by p
g
(;
~
) and p
g
(; 

), respectively. I come back to
this case once I have discussed  > 0. In what follows, I limit attention to situations
where V (
~
) > 0.
These conditions are necessary for a solution. If I were to nd various values of
the characteristics of the agents consistent with these conditions, I can easily identify
the correct solution as I explicitly calculate the value of the optimization function as a
function of .
In case (i),  = HP, p
q
(HP ; 

) = p
q
1
(p
q
2
+ (1   p
q
2
)p
q
3
) and p
q
(HP;
~
) = p
q
3
(p
q
2
+
(1  p
q
2
)p
q
1
). The array of equations A.2{A.7 becomes
(p
g
2
+ (1  p
g
3
))V (
~
)  p
g
3
(1  p
g
2
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
8
  
7
(A.8)
p
g
1
(1  p
g
3
)V (
~
)  p
g
3
(1  p
g
1
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
  
6
(A.9)
p
g
1
(1  p
g
2
)V (
~
)  (p
g
2
+ (1  p
g
2
)p
g
1
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
6
  
5
(A.10)
p
b
3
(1  p
b
2
)V (

)  (p
b
2
+ (1  p
b
2
)p
b
3
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
2
  
1
(A.11)
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pb
3
(1  p
b
1
)V (

)  p
b
1
(1  p
b
3
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
3
  
2
(A.12)
(p
b
2
+ (1  p
b
2
)p
b
1
)V (

)  p
b
1
(1  p
b
3
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
4
  
3
(A.13)
As p
g
1
(1  p
g
2
) < p
g
2
+ (1  p
g
2
)p
g
1
and V (
~
) < V (

), it follows from Equation A.10 that

6
  
5
< 0, or 
5
> 0. That is, p
g
3
=
1
2
.
Similarly, if p
b
1
< p
b
3
, then 
3
> 0 or p
b
3
= p
b
2
from Equation A.12. In Equation A.13,
if p
b
2
> 0, then p
b
2
+ (1  p
b
2
)p
b
1
> p
b
1
(1  p
b
3
), and therefore 
4
> 0 or p
b
3
=
1
2
. That is,
p
b
2
= p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
1
2
.
The Lagrangian for this case can now be rewritten as
L(p
b
1
; p
g
1
; p
g
2
; 
0
) =  
1
2
(p
g
2
+ (1  p
g
2
)p
g
1
) 

4
(1 + p
b
1
)
p
g
1
2
(p
g
2
+ 1)  
3
4
p
b
1
+
5
X
1=i

0
i
(h
0
i
  c
0
i
) (A.14)
with h
0
1
=  p
b
1
 0, h
0
2
= p
b
1

1
2
, h
0
3
=  p
g
2
  
1
2
, h
0
4
= p
g
2
  p
g
1
 0, and h
0
5
= p
g
1
 1.
If, however, in Equation A.12 p
b
1
= p
b
3
, in place of p
b
1
< p
b
3
(and hence p
b
2
= p
b
2
=
p
b
1
= p
b
, because p
b
1
 p
b
2
 p
b
3
by assumption), then 
3
= 
2
 0. One needs to
distinguish between p
b
= 0 and p
b
> 0. The case p
b
= 0 is mathematically identical
to the case  = 0. If p
b
> 0, then 
4
> 0, or p
b
= p
b
3
=
1
2
. That is, p
b
1
= p
b
2
= p
b
3
=
1
2
and 
4
> 
3
= 
2
 0. The associated maximization problem is a special case of
Equation A.14 (substituting p
b
1
=
1
2
).
If, in Equation A.13, p
b
2
= 0 and p
b
3
= 0 then p
b
1
= p
b
2
= p
b
3
= 0, and the maximiza-
tion problem is identical to problem when  = 0. If p
b
2
= 0 but p
b
3
> 0, then p
b
1
= 0,
and 
4
= 
3
= 0 (note that 
4
= 
3
> 0 is impossible as this would imply p
b
3
= p
b
2
=
1
2
,
contradicting p
b
2
= 0). Substituting p
b
1
= 0 into Equation A.12 and using the condition
40
3
= 0, this equation becomes p
b
3
V (

)
V (

)
2
=  
2
. As both p
b
3
; V (

) > 0 and 
2
 0 this
implies a contradiction.
The necessary conditions for Equation A.14 are
1
2
(1 + p
g
2
)V (
~
)  (1  p
g
2
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
0
5
  
0
4
(A.15)
1
2
p
g
1
V (
~
)  (1  p
g
1
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
0
4
  
0
3
(A.16)
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V (

)  3V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
0
2
  
0
1
(A.17)
It is useful to regard these expressions as functions of V (
~
)=V (

), p
g
1
and p
g
2
.
p
g
1
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g
2
V (
~
)
V (

)
1
2
3
4
1
1
3
1
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1 p
g
1
p
g
1
1 p
g
2
1+p
g
2
A
B
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E
Figure 5: Dierent areas imply dierent signs for Equations A.15{A.17 (case of HP).
Figure 5 depicts ve areas, ve line{segments and three points, each implying dierent
signs for Equations A.15{A.17, as reported in Table 3:
Areas like A{B stand for the line{segments between areas A and B. E{C{D refers
to the point of intersection of E, C and D. Note that if  = 0, Equation A.17 and
therefore the line
V (
~
)
V (

)
=
1
3
in Figure 5 are irrelevant.
The analysis that follows is based on the following steps. First, the table indicates
per area the signs of the Equations A.15{A.17. These signs determine which restrictions
41
Area Eqn A.15 Eqn A.16 Eqn A.17 Area Eqn A.15 Eqn A.16 Eqn A.17
A + + { B{C + 0 +
B + + + C{D 0 { +
C + { + C{E + { 0
D { { + E{C{D 0 { 0
E + { { B{C{D 0 0 +
A{B + + 0 A{B{C{E + 0 0
A{E + 0 {
Table 3: Sign of Equations A.15{A.17 for dierent areas, line{segments and points in
Figure 5.
bind and which do not. This xes some (or all) values of p
b
1
, p
b
2
and p
g
1
. These values
are then plugged into the LHS of Equations A.15{A.17 to check whether they can still
satisfy the sign requirements and have values that are mutually consistent.
In A, the complementary slackness variables should satisfy 
0
5
> 0, 
0
4
> 0 and

0
1
> 0. That is, p
g
1
= 1, p
g
2
= p
g
1
, and p
b
1
= 0 must hold. Substituting these values
into the Equations A.15{A.17 on the LHS, one obtains V (
~
) > 0, V (
~
) > 0, and
V (
~
)=V (

) >
1
3
, respectively. The latter inequality is suÆcient for the former two to
hold. It amounts to 3V (
~
) > V (

) or 3[
1
2
(1)  

4
(1)] >
1
2
(1 + 1)   
3
4
(0), or  <
2
3
.
That is, p
b
1
= 0, p
b
2
= p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
1
2
, and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1 is a solution for  <
2
3
. That is,
R(HP ; ) =
1
2
 
1
4
.
In B, the implication is that p
g
1
= 1, p
g
2
= p
g
1
, and p
b
1
=
1
2
must hold. Substituting
42
these values into the LHS of Equations A.15{A.17, these conditions amount to V (
~
) >
0, V (
~
) > 0, and V (
~
)=V (

) <
1
3
, respectively. Similar to the derivations in A, this
reduces to  2 (
2
3
;
4
3
). That is, p
b
1
=
1
2
, p
b
2
= p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
1
2
, and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1 is a solution
for  2 (
2
3
;
4
3
). Hence, R(HP; ) =
1
2
 
3
8

1 
3
8

.
In C, the signs of the equations imply p
g
1
= 1, p
g
2
=
1
2
, and p
b
1
=
1
2
. This gives
rise to inconsistent conditions: Equation A.15 requires
3
2
V (
~
) 
1
2
V (

) > 0, whereas
Equation A.16 reduces to V (
~
) < 0. As V (

) > 0 by assumption, these conditions
are inconsistent. Therefore, there is no solution in C.
In D, the signs require p
g
1
= p
g
2
, p
g
2
=
1
2
, and p
b
1
=
1
2
. These values, together with the
ones obtained from Equations A.8{A.13, imply V (
~
) = V (

), whereas Equation A.17
requires 3 V (
~
) > V (

). These conditions are inconsistent.
In E, the signs require p
g
1
= 1, p
g
2
=
1
2
, and p
b
1
= 0. This gives rise to inconsis-
tent conditions: Equation A.16 requires V (
~
) < 0, whereas Equation A.17 reduces to
V (

) 3V (
~
) < 0, which implies V (
~
) > 0 (as V (

) > 0), a contradiction. Therefore,
there is no solution in E.
On the line{segment A{B, p
g
1
= 1, p
g
2
= p
g
1
, and p
b
1
2 [0;
1
2
], must hold. For these
values, V (

) = 1 
3
4
p
b
1
and V (
~
) =
1
2
 (
1
4
+
1
4
p
b
1
), and, from Equation A.17, V (

) =
3 V (
~
). This amounts to  =
2
3
. Therefore a solution is p
b
1
2 [0;
1
2
], p
b
2
= p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
1
2
,
and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1 for  =
2
3
. Robustness equals R(HP ;
2
3
) =
1
3
.
On the line{segment A{E, p
g
1
= 1, p
g
2
2 [
1
2
; 1] and p
b
1
= 0 must hold. Substituting
p
g
1
= 1 into Equation A.16 shows that V (
~
) = 0 should hold. This, however, is in
conict with Equation A.17, which requires V (
~
) > 0.
On the line{segments B{C, C{D and C{E conicting conditions are imposed by
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Equations A.15 and A.16, A.15 and A.17, and A.16 and A.17, respectively.
In the point E{C{D, p
g
1
=
1
2
, p
g
2
=
1
2
, and p
b
1
2 [0;
1
2
], must hold (that p
g
1
=
1
2
holds
can be seen from Figure 5). For the values of (p
b
; p
g
) derived here V (

) =
3
8
  
3
4
p
b
1
and V (
~
) =
3
8
  
1
4
(1+ p
b
1
). Equation A.16 amounts to V (

) = 3 V (
~
). This requires
 = 1. However, at  = 1,
1
3
is not the minimum value of V (
~
)=V (

): this is attained
in region B, where R(HP ; 1) =
1
5
.
In the point B{C{D, p
g
1
= 1 and p
g
2
= 1 (both from Figure 5), and p
b
1
=
1
2
(from
Equation A.17) must hold. With these values of (p
b
; p
g
), V (
~
) =
1
2
  
3
8
. As V (
~
) = 0
from Equations A.15 and A.16, this amounts to  =
4
3
. That is, a solution is p
b
1
=
1
2
,
p
b
2
= p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
1
2
, and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1 for  =
4
3
. Of course, R(HP ;
4
3
) = 0.
Finally, in the point A{B{C{E, p
g
1
=
3
4
from Figure 5, whereas Equation A.15
requires p
g
1
= 1. These requirements are inconsistent.
What remains to be discussed is the case of  = 0. Now the dierences between A
and B, and between C and E respectively, are irrelevant. From the discussion of A, it
is clear that p
g
3
=
1
2
and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1 is also the optimum for  = 0. Robustness equals
R =
1
2
. In C and E, R =
2
3
, which is larger. In D, as p
g
3
= p
g
2
= p
g
1
, V (
~
) = V (

).
Hence, R = 1. In other words, for  = 0, R(HP ; 0) =
1
2
.
In case (ii), or  = PH, p
q
(PH; 

) = p
q
1
+(1  p
q
1
)p
q
2
p
q
3
and p
q
(PH;
~
) = p
q
3
+(1 
p
q
3
)p
q
1
p
q
2
:
The array of equations A.2{A.7 becomes
(1  p
g
2
p
g
3
)V (
~
)  (1  p
g
3
)p
g
2
V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
8
  
7
(A.18)
(1  p
g
1
)p
g
3
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~
)  (1  p
g
3
)p
g
1
V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
  
6
(A.19)
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g
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g
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
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  
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b
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
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b
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b
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~
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(1  p
b
1
p
b
2
)V (

)  (1  p
b
1
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b
2
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~
)
V (

)
2
= 
4
  
3
(A.23)
From Equations A.23 one obtains p
b
3
=
1
2
. When p
g
2
< 1, Equation A.20 shows that
p
g
3
=
1
2
, and substituting this value into Equation A.19 we obtain p
g
3
= p
g
2
. With this
information, the Lagrangian equals
L(p
b
1
; p
b
2
; p
g
1
; 
0
) =  
(
1
2
+
1
4
p
g
1
) 

2
(1 + p
b
1
p
b
2
)
1
4
(3p
g
1
+ 1)  (p
b
1
+
1
2
(1  p
b
1
)p
b
2
)
+
5
X
1=i

0
i
(h
0
i
  c
0
i
) (A.24)
with h
0
1
=  p
b
1
 0, h
0
2
= p
b
1
  p
b
2
 0, h
0
3
= p
b
2

1
2
, h
0
4
=  p
g
1
  
1
2
, and h
0
5
= p
g
1
 1.
If p
g
2
= 1 but p
g
3
< 1, then, from Equation A.20 
6
= 
5
= 0 (
6
= 
5
> 0 is
impossible as this would imply p
g
2
= p
g
3
=
1
2
). Substituting p
g
1
= 1, the implication of
1  p
g
1
 p
g
2
= 1, and 
6
= 0 into Equation A.19 leads to  (1   p
g
3
)
V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
. This
cannot hold as (1  p
g
3
) > 0, V (

) > 0 and 
7
 0.
The rst order conditions of Equation A.24 are
1
4
3V (
~
)  V (

)
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
)
2
= 
0
5
  
0
4
(A.25)
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~
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1
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b
1
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
)  (1  p
b
1
)V (
~
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
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2
= 
0
3
  
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As in case of  = HP above, one can usefully regard these expressions as functions of
V (
~
)=V (

), p
b
1
and p
b
2
. Figure 6 depicts ve areas, ve line{segments and three points
each implying dierent signs for Equations A.25{A.27, as reported in Table 4:
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Figure 6: Dierent areas imply dierent signs for Equations A.25{A.27 (case of PH).
In A, the complementary slackness variables of Equations A.25{A.27 are such that
p
g
1
= 1, p
b
1
= 0 and p
b
2
= p
b
1
must hold, respectively. With these values V (

) = 1 and
V (
~
) =
3
4
 
1
2
. In A, V (
~
)=V (

) >
1
3
should hold, or  <
5
6
. That is, p
b
1
= p
b
2
= 0,
p
b
3
= p
g
3
= p
g
2
=
1
2
, p
g
1
= 1 solves the optimization problem for  <
5
6
. Therefore,
R(PH; ) =
3
4
 
1
2
.
In B, p
g
1
= 1, p
b
1
= 0 and p
b
2
=
1
2
leads to inconsistent requirements. As p
b
1
=
0, Equation A.27 reduces to V (
~
) < 0. However, this cannot be reconciled with
V (
~
)=V (

) >
1
3
(from Equation A.25) since V (

) > 0.
In C, p
g
1
=
1
2
, p
b
1
= 0 and p
b
2
=
1
2
. This amounts to requiring both V (
~
)=V (

) <
1
3
(because of Equation A.25) and V (
~
)=V (

) >
1
3
(Equation A.26). These conditions
are inconsistent.
In D, because p
g
1
= p
b
1
= p
b
2
=
1
2
, all agents are equal. Hence, V (
~
) = V (

), which
cannot be reconciled with the requirement 3V (
~
) < V (

) of Equation A.25.
In E, p
g
1
=
1
2
, p
b
1
= 0 and p
b
2
= p
b
1
. Hence, V (
~
) =
5
8
 
1
2
 and V (

) =
5
8
. In E,
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Area Eqn A.25 Eqn A.26 Eqn A.27 Area Eqn A.25 Eqn A.26 Eqn A.27
A + { { B{C 0 { +
B + { + C{D { 0 +
C { { + C{E { { 0
D { + + E{C{D { 0 0
E { { { B{C{D 0 0 +
A{B + { 0 A{B{C{E 0 { 0
A{E 0 { {
Table 4: Sign of Equations A.25{A.27 for dierent areas, line{segments and points in
Figure 6.
V (
~
)=V (

) 2 (0;
1
3
). Therefore, if  2 (
5
6
;
5
4
), p
b
1
= p
b
2
= 0, p
b
3
= p
g
3
= p
g
2
= p
g
1
=
1
2
solves the optimization problem. Robustness equals R(PH; ) = 1 
4
5
.
On the line{segment A{B, p
g
1
= 1, p
b
1
= 0, and p
b
2
2 [0;
1
2
] must hold. This leads
to inconsistent conditions: Equation A.25 requires 3 V (
~
) > V (

), whereas Equa-
tion A.25 amounts to V (
~
) = 0. As V (

) > 0, these conditions cannot be reconciled.
Similar inconsistent conditions for V (

) and V (
~
) are obtained on the line{segments
B{C, C{D and C{E.
On the line{segment A{E, p
g
1
2 [
1
2
; 1], p
b
1
= 0 and p
b
1
= p
b
2
must hold. This amounts
to V (
~
) =
1
4
p
g
1
+
1
2
 
1
2
 and V (

) =
3
4
p
g
1
+
1
4
. From Equation A.25, or V (
~
)=V (

) =
1
3
,
one derives that  =
5
6
. In other words, a consistent solution is p
b
1
= p
b
2
= 0, p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
p
g
2
=
1
2
and p
g
1
2 [
1
2
; 1] for  =
5
6
. Obviously, R(PH;
5
6
) =
1
3
.
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In the point E{C{D, p
g
1
=
1
2
, p
b
1
= p
b
2
= 0 (from Figure 6). Equation A.25 amounts
to V (
~
)=V (

) <
1
3
, whereas both Equations A.26 and A.27 require V (
~
) = 0, where
V (
~
) =
5
8
  
1
2
and V (

) =
5
8
. That is, p
b
1
= p
b
2
= 0, p
b
3
= p
g
3
= p
g
2
= p
g
1
=
1
2
solves the
optimization problem for  =
5
4
. Hence, R(PH;
5
4
) = 0.
In the point B{C{D, p
b
1
= p
b
2
=
1
2
(from Figure 6) and p
g
1
2 [
1
2
; 1]. Both Equa-
tion A.25 and A.26 amount to V (
~
)=V (

) =
1
3
, whereas Equation A.27 requires
V (
~
) < V (

). For these values of (p
b
; p
g
), V (
~
) =
1
2
+
1
4
p
g
1
 (
5
8
) and V (

) =
1
4
+
3
4
p
g
1
 
(
5
8
). These expressions can be made consistent with the condition V (
~
)=V (

) =
1
3
if and only if  = 1. However, for  = 1,
1
3
is not the minimum value of V (
~
)=V (

).
The minimum value is attained in region E : R(PH; 1) =
1
5
.
Finally the point A{B{C{E. Here p
b
1
= 1=4 from Figure 6, but p
b
1
= 0 from Equa-
tion A.26. These requirements are inconsistent.
The case of  = 0 becomes particularly easy when  = PH, as the rst order
conditions of Equation A.24 reduce to Equation A.25. When V (
~
)=V (

) <
1
3
, p
g
1
=
1
2
,
and so p
g
1
= p
g
2
= p
g
3
. That is, V (
~
) = V (

). This violates V (
~
)=V (

) <
1
3
. If
V (
~
)=V (

) =
1
3
, then 3

1
2
+
1
4
p
g
1

=
1
2
+
3
4
p
g
1
must hold. This is impossible for all
p
g
1
. Finally, if V (
~
)=V (

) >
1
3
, then p
g
1
= 1, and V (
~
)=V (

) equals
3
4
. That is,
R(PH; 0) =
3
4
.
In case (iii), or  = O, the optimal allocation depends on the values of  and
(p
b
; p
g
) as specied in Equations 8 and 7. The case, (iiiA), of 

(O) = (
a
; 
r
; ) will
be discussed rst, followed by (iiiB), 

(O) = (
r
; 
a
; ). In any event, from Result 3,
we know that either
~

1
= (; 
r
; 
a
) and
~

2
= (; 
a
; 
r
) maximizes the drop in relative
performance.
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In (iiiA), with 

(O
2
) = (
a
; 
r
; ) and
~
 =
~

1
, the rst{order conditions Equa-
tions A.2{A.7 become
p
g
3
V (
~
)  (p
g
3
  p
g
2
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
8
  
7
(A.28)
(1  p
g
3
)V (
~
)  (1  p
g
1
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
  
6
(A.29)
(p
g
1
  p
g
2
)V (
~
)  p
g
1
V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
6
  
5
(A.30)
(p
b
3
  p
b
2
)V (

)  p
b
3
V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
2
  
1
(A.31)
(1  p
b
1
)V (

)  (1  p
b
3
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
3
  
2
(A.32)
p
b
1
V (

)  (p
b
1
  p
b
2
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
4
  
3
(A.33)
In Equation A.28, p
g
3
  p
g
2
 0, and so 
8
  
7
> 0 or 
8
> 0, implying p
g
1
= 1.
Substituting p
g
1
= 1 into Equation A.29, one observes that if p
g
3
< 1, then 
7
  
6
> 0
or 
7
> 0, which amounts to p
g
2
= p
g
1
. If, on the other hand, p
g
3
= 1, then p
g
1
= p
g
2
= 1
by assumption. That is, Equation A.29 always requires p
g
1
= p
g
2
= 1. Equation A.30
implies 
6
  
5
< 0 or 
5
> 0. That is, p
g
3
=
1
2
. Hence, if  = 0, in which case one
is only interested in the solution for p
g
1
, p
g
2
, and p
g
3
, R(O
2
; 0) =
1
2
. In Equation A.32,
1   p
b
1
 1   p
b
3
, and therefore 
3
  
2
> 0 or 
3
> 0, implying p
b
2
= p
b
3
. Using this
equality, and assuming p
b
3
> 0, one derives from Equation A.31 
2
  
1
< 0 or 
1
> 0.
That is p
b
1
= 0. If, on the other hand, p
b
3
= 0, then p
b
1
= 0 by assumption. That is,
Equation A.31 always requires p
b
1
= 0. Substituting this value into Equation A.33,
one obtains 
4
  
3
> 0 if p
b
2
> 0, i.e., 
4
> 0 or p
b
3
=
1
2
. If, on the other hand,
p
b
2
= 0, then 
4
  
3
= 0. In other words, there are two possible vectors. The
rst is p
b
1
= 0, p
b
2
= p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
1
2
, and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1. With these values of (p
b
; p
g
),
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V (
~
) =
1
2
 
1
2
 and V (

) = 1  
1
4
, and therefore R(O
2
; ) =
1
2
 
1
2

1 
1
4

. The second
vector is p
b
1
= p
b
2
= p
b
3
= 0, p
g
3
=
1
2
, and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1. Then V (
~
) =
1
2
and V (

) = 1,
and so R(O
2
; ) =
1
2
. Clearly, in the former case the drop in performance is larger than
in the latter case. In other words, the vector that maximizes the drop in protability
equals p
b
1
= 0, p
b
2
= p
b
3
= p
g
3
=
1
2
, and p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1. Hence, for
~
 =
~

1
R(O
2
; ) =
1
2
 
1
2

1 
1
4

.
If 

(O) = (
a
; 
r
; ), but
~
 =
~

2
, the rst{order conditions of Equations A.2{A.7
become
p
g
3
V (
~
)  (p
g
2
  p
g
3
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
8
  
7
(A.34)
(1  p
g
3
)V (
~
)  p
g
1
V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
  
6
(A.35)
(p
g
1
  p
g
2
)V (
~
)  (1  p
g
1
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
6
  
5
(A.36)
(p
b
2
  p
b
3
)V (

)  p
b
3
V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
2
  
1
(A.37)
p
b
1
V (

)  (1  p
b
3
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
3
  
2
(A.38)
(1  p
b
1
)V (

)  (p
b
1
  p
b
2
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
4
  
3
(A.39)
From Equation A.35, 1   p
g
3
< p
g
1
, and therefore 
7
  
6
< 0. That is, 
6
> 0 or
p
g
2
= p
g
3
. Substituting this equality into Equation A.34, one notes that 
8
> 0 or
p
g
1
= 1. Equation A.36 does not provide any additional information at this stage.
From Equation A.39, 1  p
b
1
> p
b
1
  p
b
2
, and therefore 
4
  
3
> 0. That is, 
4
> 0 or
p
b
3
=
1
2
.
Substituting this value into Equation A.38 and observing that p
b
2
  p
b
3
 0 one
obtains 
1
> 0 or p
b
1
= 0. Substituting p
b
1
= 0 into Equation A.39, one notes that

2
> 0 or p
b
1
= p
b
2
. That is, p
b
1
= p
b
2
= 0, p
b
3
=
1
2
, p
g
3
= p
g
2
and p
g
1
= 1. The value of p
g
3
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remains to be determined. The function to be maximized reduces to
1
2
   p
g
3
p
g
3
(2  p
g
3
)
(A.40)
subject to
1
2
 p
g
3
 1. For an interior solution p
g
3
should solve
 p
g
3
2
+p
g
3
 
[p
g
3
(2 p
g
3
)]
2
= 0. For
the solution to this problem to be a real number  > 4 must hold. However, for such
values V (
~
) < 0. Therefore, one has to look for a boundary solution. If p
g
3
=
1
2
,
R(O
2
; ) =
2
3
 
2
3
, whereas for p
g
3
= 1, R(O
2
; ) = 1 
1
2
. Since 1 
1
2
 >
2
3
 
2
3
, the
drop in relative performance is maximized when p
g
3
=
1
2
. Hence, R(O
2
; ) =
2
3
 
2
3
.
One observes that R(O
2
; ) is smaller if
~

1
than in case of
~

2
. In other words,
~

1
maximizes the drop in relative performance.
In case (iiiB), 

(O) = (
r
; 
a
; ). If
~

1
= (; 
r
; 
a
), the rst{order conditions of
Equations A.2{A.7 become
(1  p
g
3
)V (
~
)  (p
g
3
  p
g
2
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
8
  
7
(A.41)
p
g
3
V (
~
)  (1  p
g
1
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
  
6
(A.42)
(p
g
2
  p
g
1
)V (
~
)  p
g
1
V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
6
  
5
(A.43)
(p
b
3
  p
b
2
)V (

)  (1  p
b
3
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
2
  
1
(A.44)
(1  p
b
1
)V (

)  p
b
3
V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
3
  
2
(A.45)
p
b
1
V (

)  (p
b
2
  p
b
1
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
4
  
3
(A.46)
Analysis similar to that conducted in case (iiiA) for
~
 =
~

2
shows that p
b
1
= 0, p
b
2
= p
b
3
,
p
g
3
=
1
2
, p
g
2
= p
g
1
= 1. With this information, the function to be maximized reduces to
p
b
3
 
1
2
1  [p
g
3
]
2
(A.47)
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subject to 0  p
b
3

1
2
. For an interior solution p
b
3
should solve
p
b
3
2
 p
g
3
+1
[1 [p
g
3
]
2
]
2
= 0. For the
solution to this problem to be a real number  <
1
4
must hold. For these admissible
values of , the solution p
b
3
62 [0;
1
2
]. Therefore, one has to look for a boundary solution.
If p
b
3
=
1
2
, R(O
1
; ) =
1
2
1 
1 
1
4

, whereas for p
b
3
= 0, R(O
1
; ) =
1
2
. As
1 
1 
1
4

< 1, the
solution to the optimization problem is p
b
3
=
1
2
, and therefore R(O
1
; ) =
1
2
1 
1 
1
4

if
~
 =
~

1
.
If
~
 =
~

2
, however, the rst{order conditions of Equations A.2{A.7 become
(1  p
g
3
)V (
~
)  (p
g
2
  p
g
3
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
8
  
7
(A.48)
p
g
3
V (
~
)  p
g
1
V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
7
  
6
(A.49)
(p
g
2
  p
g
1
)V (
~
)  (1  p
g
1
)V (

)
V (

)
2
= 
6
  
5
(A.50)
(p
b
2
  p
b
3
)V (

)  (1  p
b
3
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
2
  
1
(A.51)
p
b
1
V (

)  p
b
3
V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
3
  
2
(A.52)
(1  p
b
1
)V (

)  (p
b
2
  p
b
1
)V (
~
)
V (

)
2
= 
4
  
3
(A.53)
Analysis similar to that conducted in case (iiiA) for
~
 =
~

1
shows that p
b
1
= p
b
2
= 0,
p
b
3
= p
g
3
= p
g
2
=
1
2
and p
g
1
= 1. Therefore, R(O
1
; ) =
2
3
 
2
3
. Note that R(O
1
; ) is
smaller for
~

1
than for
~

2
. Hence,
~

1
maximizes the drop in relative performance.
Summing up, in (iiiA), 

(O) = (
a
; 
r
; ) and in (iiiB), 

(O) = (
r
; 
a
; ). In
either case,
~

1
= (; 
r
; 
a
) and (p
b
; p
g
) = (0; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1; 1) maximize the drop in
relative performance. We now have to check for these values of (p
b
; p
g
) whether 

(O) =
(
a
; 
r
; ) or 

(O) = (
r
; 
a
; ) maximizes expected prots. Using Equation 8, with

1
= (
a
; 
r
; ) and 
2
= (
r
; 
a
; ), one can easily see that V (
1
; ;O) V (
3
; ;O) =
52
0 for the vector (p
b
; p
g
) under consideration. 2
Proof of Lemma 1 Dierentiating H with respect to p
g
1
yields
@H
@p
g
1
=
4
3
p
g
1
 
2
3
[p
g
2
+ p
g
3
]


4
3
p
g
1
 
4
3
p
g
2
(A.54)
where (*) uses p
g
2
 p
g
3
. That is, if p
g
1
> p
g
2
, then
@H
@p
g
1
> 0, and so p
g
1
= 1. If p
g
1
= p
g
2
,
obviously p
g
3
< p
g
2
(otherwise agents would be identical as far as good projects are con-
cerned, implying H
g
= 0), and dierentiating H with respect to p
g
2
, and substituting
p
g
1
= p
g
2
yields
@H
@p
g
2
=
4
3
(p
g
2
  p
g
3
) > 0. That is, if p
g
1
= p
g
2
, then p
g
2
as large as possible,
or p
g
1
= p
g
2
= 1. In any event, p
g
1
= 1. Similar analysis shows that in any event p
g
3
=
1
2
.
With this information
@H
@p
g
2
=
4
3
p
g
2
 
2
3
. That is, p
g
2
2

1
2
; 1
	
. In any event H =
1
6
.
Clearly, heterogeneity is maximized when either (p
g
3
; p
g
2
; p
g
1
) equals (
1
2
;
1
2
; 1) or (1;
1
2
; 1).
By the same token, when projects are bad, the spread is maximized when (p
b
3
; p
b
2
; p
b
1
)
equals (0;
1
2
;
1
2
) or (0; 0;
1
2
). 2
Proof of Result 5 This follows directly from a comparison of the vectors (p
b
; p
g
)
reported in Table 1 and Lemma 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 2 This can be seen by applying Denition 6 to the fourth
column of Table 2. 2
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